One organizational address
Members can contact a published organizational identity rather than needing to know an individual caseworker. Identity, purpose and account type must be correctly provisioned.
One organizational service address. Two protected communication rooms. An accountable process from an insured-person request to a controlled reply.
Interactive browser simulation with synthetic data; no live Matrix connection.
Separate E2EE boundaries. No uninterrupted member-to-employee E2EE when a trusted intermediary decrypts and re-encrypts.
Three benefits to evaluate in the service workflow.
Members can contact a published organizational identity rather than needing to know an individual caseworker. Identity, purpose and account type must be correctly provisioned.
Caseworkers collaborate in a separate internal context. External messages must not reveal employees, internal discussions or private room metadata.
Employee authorization, message revision and recipient binding are checked before publication. An unclear send requires reconciliation, not a second automatic send.
Human-assisted and automated accounts share communication boundaries. A bot label does not bypass authorization or release decisions.
The insured person writes to the published service address, or is invited into the external room under an approved process.
An integrating host associates an external and internal case room while respecting separate E2EE trust boundaries.
Only authorized staff join the internal room; pending invitations can be revoked independently of approval permissions.
Incoming events can be presented internally. Attachments, event variants, internal notices and provenance require an explicit contract.
A reviewer with the right approval role authorizes a fixed recipient and version. Editing or withdrawing rights invalidates release.
A homeserver acknowledgement is not recipient delivery. Unknown outcomes, restarts and departures follow defined safe branches.
Model a request or an invitation followed by a separate message, two room boundaries, employee access, bot triage, named approval and uncertain Matrix outcomes. All events are local.
Design model, not a connected product demo. No real rooms, messages, users, files, E2EE keys, authentication, providers or BPMN processes are created. A browser reload resets the example.
Switching view resets the local example. Both views share one validated state machine; the guided version is not a second process engine.
Click each stage. A real host would require persistence, correlation, authorization and incident evidence. The final send outcome is deliberately NOT selected automatically.
A synthetic member request starts a case.
The host creates a logical link between separate E2EE rooms.
Invitation and acceptance are separate, individually logged events.
Bot triage (if chosen) precedes the response draft.
First verify a named reviewer’s approval role; then approve the exact recipient-bound revision. Neither is inferred from room membership.
Choose HS acceptance OR an uncertain outcome; no automatic receipt.
After an uncertain result, first model restart. Then choose located transaction or manual escalation; "not found" never authorizes blind resend.
tim-fa · Service
Not opened
Contact: published organizational identity (tim-fa / tim-bot)
Headless Clientmodul Pro · local module API
Rooms not paired
Separate E2EE boundaries · no direct member-to-employee E2EE
Not opened
No employee invited
Next safe step: Start request
No internal reply draft yet.
Illustrative flow: a member opens an external room; the trusted host creates a separate internal room, checks membership and authorized release, and handles unknown delivery without blind retries. Enable JavaScript to walk through the states.
Only the first valid action is enabled.
Only the eight most recent events are shown. Browser memory only; no real audit record.
Illustrative event log stored in page memory only; not an audit trail.
Non-interactive service operation requires approved authentication and secret rotation. A 2FA bypass is not a security concept.
Joining or leaving a room and the employee’s right to approve are different decisions. Revoke pending invitations when access is withdrawn.
Two separately encrypted Matrix rooms. An authorized service would decrypt and re-encrypt; an outside participant must not receive internal staff metadata.
A homeserver acknowledgement is not delivery. If reconciliation is inconclusive, manual escalation remains required: not found is not proof of non-delivery.
The browser walkthrough verifies interaction rules, not these operating contracts. Agree measurable acceptance criteria and evidence before a pilot.
Published account type, purpose/authorization, unattended authentication and secret rotation
Acceptance evidence pendingPairing, revoke before join, employee removal and member departure, including negative cases
Acceptance evidence pendingAttachment metadata, event types, edits, recipient/revision-bound approval and no staff identity leakage
Acceptance evidence pendingTransaction IDs, uncertain outcomes, duplicate suppression, restart, controlled reconciliation and incident ownership
Acceptance evidence pendingIntegration and forwarding must be assessed against the applicable TI-M specification, purpose, provider permissions and security concept. This model does not claim end-to-end interoperability, permitted bridging, operating high availability or product qualification.
These action identifiers belong to the existing browser model; there is no separate BPMN execution engine behind this demonstration. TI-Flow Fachdienst Task states follow a different, externally authoritative FHIR contract.
request → pair → invite → join → inbound → draftEvidence: Guided / expert browser simulation
Case setup needs a host, persistent correlation and permissions.
verifyRole → approve; revokeRole / reviseEvidence: Negative and positive browser checks
Approval is linked to reviewer, recipient and exact message revision; membership alone is insufficient.
ack OR unknownEvidence: Both outcomes simulated; HS ACK is not delivery
Only known outcomes advance; no blind repeat after UNKNOWN.
unknown → restart → reconcile OR escalateEvidence: Uncertain-outcome branch simulated; no real timer
A production timer is a separate host/BPMN duty; unresolved results require review.
cancelExternalInvite / revoke / remove / revokeRoleEvidence: Expert actions exist; no transaction-wide rollback
Withdraw pending access or approvals; never undo a message already transmitted.
restart → reconcile / escalateEvidence: Simulated transaction lookup / manual escalation
Host must persist correlation, outbox and incident evidence before a real integration.
The distinct TI-Flow_26_3 Fachdienst and FHIR Task scope remains separately verifiable. TI-Flow authority model →
A room-to-room mediator is a trusted endpoint in each room. When it decrypts and re-encrypts, there is no uninterrupted E2EE between the insured person and the employee. This does not, by itself, establish whether forwarding is permitted; A_28683 specifically restricts bridging into other messenger systems.
Boundary: Device and client-side room state
External-room messages visible to authorized room members
Boundary: Encrypted room boundary
External membership and room keys do not authorize internal-room access
Boundary: Authorized intermediary may decrypt and re-encrypt
Host sees permitted plaintext; authorization, isolation, retention and audit are host duties
Boundary: Local module API and Rust-owned E2EE/session state
Host interface is not a network API of the Headless module; key handling stays in its product boundary
Boundary: Independent encrypted room boundary
Staff members and keys are separate from the external room
Boundary: Fully supported in-process Java/FFM integration with Rust Core
Same JVM/native process is not a process-isolation guarantee; host qualification open
Before deployment: document room membership, key custody, permitted purpose, provider approval and retention for this specific integration.
Target technical communication component: Matrix rooms, E2EE, session and event handling through a local module interface.
Headless boundary →The host owns permitted routing, durable room pairing, authorization, case policy, outbox, audit evidence, incident response and any authorized network interface.
BPMN foundation →The organization must agree identity provisioning, service authentication, staff permissions, security assessment and lawful operating scope with the responsible parties.
Identity & approval model →Forwarding and any network-facing integration require assessment of the applicable TI-Messenger requirements, the intended purpose, provider permissions and the specific host design. A Headless module interface itself remains local.
Each checkpoint needs an applicability decision, an accountable owner and documented evidence.
Assess the actual federation and cross-room forwarding design with the responsible Provider; do not assume that a technically possible relay is a permitted bridge.
Verify the integrator is an eligible healthcare organization and any processed medical data is used only for healthcare delivery or its organization; define isolation for mixed-purpose systems.
Clarify required GTI change approval and controlled commissioning before connecting a real service; review the applicable Inbetriebnahme concept.
The Headless integration API must NOT be a network interface, even on localhost. Separate and secure any independently designed host-facing network API.
Selected references: Headless Clientmodul Pro PTV 1.0.0-0 and Anbieter TI-M Pro ATV 1.2.0-0. Determine the applicable releases and requirement owners for the integration.
Each step needs an owner, a test environment and an explicit acceptance decision.
Agree the service identity, account type (tim-fa / tim-bot), intended purpose, scenarios and responsible operator.
Review service authentication, key handling, 2FA policy, access permissions, data minimization, E2EE boundaries and provider constraints.
Run real tests for invitations, room pairing, events, attachments, approvals, membership changes and restart behavior.
Document transaction reconciliation, monitoring, retention, incident ownership and applicable regulatory or qualification decisions.
Before a pilot, independently verify live Matrix/Fachdienst integration, authentication, durable outbox, key recovery, high availability and E2EE behavior.
Explore TI-M Pro architecture →Funktionsaccount / approval model →Product evidence & status →
Discuss the insurer scenario, allowed integration boundaries, pilot evidence and responsibilities before implementation commitments.