Enterprise application · evaluation concept

TI-M Automat for health insurers

One organizational service address. Two protected communication rooms. An accountable process from an insured-person request to a controlled reply.

Interactive browser simulation with synthetic data; no live Matrix connection.

External E2EE roomInsured personRequest or invitation
Trusted host · target designTI-M AutomatHeadless · Events · Policy · BPMN optional
Internal E2EE roomStaff / contact centerAuthorized collaboration

Separate E2EE boundaries. No uninterrupted member-to-employee E2EE when a trusted intermediary decrypts and re-encrypts.

Value for health insurers

A reachable service address without losing control.

Three benefits to evaluate in the service workflow.

01

One organizational address

Members can contact a published organizational identity rather than needing to know an individual caseworker. Identity, purpose and account type must be correctly provisioned.

02

Separated staff collaboration

Caseworkers collaborate in a separate internal context. External messages must not reveal employees, internal discussions or private room metadata.

03

Deliberate release, no blind retries

Employee authorization, message revision and recipient binding are checked before publication. An unclear send requires reconciliation, not a second automatic send.

From contact to controlled response

The complete workflow at a glance

Human-assisted and automated accounts share communication boundaries. A bot label does not bypass authorization or release decisions.

  1. Request or invitation

    The insured person writes to the published service address, or is invited into the external room under an approved process.

  2. Pair the room contexts

    An integrating host associates an external and internal case room while respecting separate E2EE trust boundaries.

  3. Invite authorized staff

    Only authorized staff join the internal room; pending invitations can be revoked independently of approval permissions.

  4. Route inward, prepare a reply

    Incoming events can be presented internally. Attachments, event variants, internal notices and provenance require an explicit contract.

  5. Approve one reply revision

    A reviewer with the right approval role authorizes a fixed recipient and version. Editing or withdrawing rights invalidates release.

  6. Reconcile delivery evidence

    A homeserver acknowledgement is not recipient delivery. Unknown outcomes, restarts and departures follow defined safe branches.

Walk through both entry paths, approvals and failure branches ↓
TI-M Automat · interactive target scenario

Two rooms. One controlled service workflow.

Model a request or an invitation followed by a separate message, two room boundaries, employee access, bot triage, named approval and uncertain Matrix outcomes. All events are local.

Design model, not a connected product demo. No real rooms, messages, users, files, E2EE keys, authentication, providers or BPMN processes are created. A browser reload resets the example.

External E2EE room

Insured person

tim-fa · Service

Not opened

Contact: published organizational identity (tim-fa / tim-bot)

Message / attachment

—

Published reply / visibility

—

Host application · optional BPMN

TI-M Automat

Headless Clientmodul Pro · local module API

Room pairingInvites & rolesEvent routingApproval policyReceipt / recovery

Rooms not paired

Separate E2EE boundaries · no direct member-to-employee E2EE

Internal E2EE room

Claims / contact-center staff

Not opened

No employee invited

Internal routing / draft

—

Internal membership notice (m.notice)

—

Approval permission · separate from room membership

Approval permission not checked · external send blocked

Synthetic approval record · not a backend audit trail

—

Outbound release / evidence

—

Technical state progress0 / 8
0 / 8

Next safe step: Start request

No internal reply draft yet.

Illustrative flow: a member opens an external room; the trusted host creates a separate internal room, checks membership and authorized release, and handles unknown delivery without blind retries. Enable JavaScript to walk through the states.

Scenario event log

  1. No scenario events yet.

Only the eight most recent events are shown. Browser memory only; no real audit record.

Illustrative event log stored in page memory only; not an audit trail.

Service authentication

Non-interactive service operation requires approved authentication and secret rotation. A 2FA bypass is not a security concept.

Invitation & authorization

Joining or leaving a room and the employee’s right to approve are different decisions. Revoke pending invitations when access is withdrawn.

Forwarding boundary

Two separately encrypted Matrix rooms. An authorized service would decrypt and re-encrypt; an outside participant must not receive internal staff metadata.

Receipt & restoration

A homeserver acknowledgement is not delivery. If reconciliation is inconclusive, manual escalation remains required: not found is not proof of non-delivery.

Pilot readiness · verification plan

What must be demonstrated in a real integration

The browser walkthrough verifies interaction rules, not these operating contracts. Agree measurable acceptance criteria and evidence before a pilot.

Identity & access

Published account type, purpose/authorization, unattended authentication and secret rotation

Acceptance evidence pending

Rooms & membership

Pairing, revoke before join, employee removal and member departure, including negative cases

Acceptance evidence pending

Message integrity

Attachment metadata, event types, edits, recipient/revision-bound approval and no staff identity leakage

Acceptance evidence pending

Failure & evidence

Transaction IDs, uncertain outcomes, duplicate suppression, restart, controlled reconciliation and incident ownership

Acceptance evidence pending

Integration and forwarding must be assessed against the applicable TI-M specification, purpose, provider permissions and security concept. This model does not claim end-to-end interoperability, permitted bridging, operating high availability or product qualification.

BPMN · Action-to-outcome trace

Success, refusal, timeout and recovery have different meanings.

These action identifiers belong to the existing browser model; there is no separate BPMN execution engine behind this demonstration. TI-Flow Fachdienst Task states follow a different, externally authoritative FHIR contract.

Positive path

request → pair → invite → join → inbound → draft

Evidence: Guided / expert browser simulation

Case setup needs a host, persistent correlation and permissions.

Approval gateway

verifyRole → approve; revokeRole / revise

Evidence: Negative and positive browser checks

Approval is linked to reviewer, recipient and exact message revision; membership alone is insufficient.

Send / uncertain outcome

ack OR unknown

Evidence: Both outcomes simulated; HS ACK is not delivery

Only known outcomes advance; no blind repeat after UNKNOWN.

Timeout / escalation

unknown → restart → reconcile OR escalate

Evidence: Uncertain-outcome branch simulated; no real timer

A production timer is a separate host/BPMN duty; unresolved results require review.

Compensation

cancelExternalInvite / revoke / remove / revokeRole

Evidence: Expert actions exist; no transaction-wide rollback

Withdraw pending access or approvals; never undo a message already transmitted.

Recovery

restart → reconcile / escalate

Evidence: Simulated transaction lookup / manual escalation

Host must persist correlation, outbox and incident evidence before a real integration.

The distinct TI-Flow_26_3 Fachdienst and FHIR Task scope remains separately verifiable. TI-Flow authority model →

E2EE · Trust Boundaries

Two encrypted rooms, one explicit plaintext boundary.

A room-to-room mediator is a trusted endpoint in each room. When it decrypts and re-encrypts, there is no uninterrupted E2EE between the insured person and the employee. This does not, by itself, establish whether forwarding is permitted; A_28683 specifically restricts bridging into other messenger systems.

User client / insured person

Boundary: Device and client-side room state

External-room messages visible to authorized room members

External Matrix room

Boundary: Encrypted room boundary

External membership and room keys do not authorize internal-room access

TI-M Automat · trusted host

Boundary: Authorized intermediary may decrypt and re-encrypt

Host sees permitted plaintext; authorization, isolation, retention and audit are host duties

Headless Clientmodul Pro

Boundary: Local module API and Rust-owned E2EE/session state

Host interface is not a network API of the Headless module; key handling stays in its product boundary

Internal Matrix room

Boundary: Independent encrypted room boundary

Staff members and keys are separate from the external room

Java/Quarkus integration path

Boundary: Fully supported in-process Java/FFM integration with Rust Core

Same JVM/native process is not a process-isolation guarantee; host qualification open

Before deployment: document room membership, key custody, permitted purpose, provider approval and retention for this specific integration.

Transparent system boundaries

Technology, business logic and operator responsibility stay separate.

Headless Clientmodul Pro

Target technical communication component: Matrix rooms, E2EE, session and event handling through a local module interface.

Headless boundary →

Integrating host and optional BPMN

The host owns permitted routing, durable room pairing, authorization, case policy, outbox, audit evidence, incident response and any authorized network interface.

BPMN foundation →

Organization and provider

The organization must agree identity provisioning, service authentication, staff permissions, security assessment and lawful operating scope with the responsible parties.

Identity & approval model →

Forwarding and any network-facing integration require assessment of the applicable TI-Messenger requirements, the intended purpose, provider permissions and the specific host design. A Headless module interface itself remains local.

Normative checkpoints

Four decisions before any real two-room integration

Each checkpoint needs an applicability decision, an accountable owner and documented evidence.

01 · A_28683

Provider / bridging boundary

Assess the actual federation and cross-room forwarding design with the responsible Provider; do not assume that a technically possible relay is a permitted bridge.

Provider + IntegratorOPEN · independent decision needed
02 · A_28725 / A_28733

Authorized organization and purpose

Verify the integrator is an eligible healthcare organization and any processed medical data is used only for healthcare delivery or its organization; define isolation for mixed-purpose systems.

Organization + complianceOPEN · independent decision needed
03 · A_28849 / A_28685

Integration change and commissioning

Clarify required GTI change approval and controlled commissioning before connecting a real service; review the applicable Inbetriebnahme concept.

Provider + operating teamOPEN · independent decision needed
04 · A_28651

Local module API vs. host network

The Headless integration API must NOT be a network interface, even on localhost. Separate and secure any independently designed host-facing network API.

Manufacturer + integratorOPEN · independent decision needed

Selected references: Headless Clientmodul Pro PTV 1.0.0-0 and Anbieter TI-M Pro ATV 1.2.0-0. Determine the applicable releases and requirement owners for the integration.

Pilot evaluation · agreed evidence

From the model to verifiable integration evidence.

Each step needs an owner, a test environment and an explicit acceptance decision.

01

Scope

Agree the service identity, account type (tim-fa / tim-bot), intended purpose, scenarios and responsible operator.

02

Security

Review service authentication, key handling, 2FA policy, access permissions, data minimization, E2EE boundaries and provider constraints.

03

Integration evidence

Run real tests for invitations, room pairing, events, attachments, approvals, membership changes and restart behavior.

04

Acceptance decision

Document transaction reconciliation, monitoring, retention, incident ownership and applicable regulatory or qualification decisions.

Before a pilot, independently verify live Matrix/Fachdienst integration, authentication, durable outbox, key recovery, high availability and E2EE behavior.

Explore TI-M Pro architecture →Funktionsaccount / approval model →Product evidence & status →

Evaluate TI-M automation for your service processes.

Discuss the insurer scenario, allowed integration boundaries, pilot evidence and responsibilities before implementation commitments.

Discuss an evaluation →