Integration boundary
API, SDK, profile and adapter contracts for explicitly named target systems and versions.
MEMM structures technical responsibility into distinct layers. The model describes architecture and development direction; it is not a blanket promise of production operation, platform coverage or specification conformance.
API, SDK, profile and adapter contracts for explicitly named target systems and versions.
Processing, state and failure contracts with named technical ownership.
Separate identity, policy and execution decisions inside the agreed scope.
Binding source state, configuration, verification environment and result to a concrete version.
The objective is not to avoid Zulassung, qualification or regulatory review. The objective is to bound the technical change surface: external deltas are handled where they arise, while host contracts remain stable as long as the defined product boundary is not crossed.
When external protocol or specification semantics are distributed across several host layers, even a bounded delta can touch multiple teams and release surfaces at once.
MEMM is intended to keep external changes inside a controlled product surface. Only when a delta actually changes the agreed boundary does it become a host or architecture change.
The four steps are an architecture and review logic, not a statement about Zulassung scope or actual savings in a specific project.
Applications and partners should integrate against named interfaces, data shapes and error semantics rather than internal details of external engines or moving specification drafts.
Four equal categories — not weighting, maturity or progress.
Software-based TI access, digital identities and Zero Trust change the integration environment. MEMM treats them as named external and control boundaries rather than silently merging them into one product core.
TI-Gateway and approved access services are outside the MEMM product boundary. MEMM is not described as a connector or TI-Gateway replacement.
The current development model maps external EUDI Wallet, Health ID and eID-LE evidence through a versioned adapter boundary into canonical identity and attribute contexts. Verification and application authorization remain separate.
Explicit identity, attribute, policy and execution decisions support a Zero-Trust-oriented separation. No ZETA integration or general OIDC/federation support is inferred.
These are development and verification criteria. Whether they are met by a concrete version depends on that release and its evidence.
Changes should flow through named event and subscription paths. Externally required polling remains an explicitly documented boundary.
Missing configuration, unknown versions or insufficient permissions should result in typed rejection instead of silent fallbacks.
State, workflow, identity, routing and evidence references should each have a named authoritative owner.
Backpressure, limits and controlled retries should avoid unbounded processing and unclear side effects.
External profiles, drafts and integration requirements can evolve. Versioned adapters and contracts should absorb these changes without automatically changing the product core promise.
This is an orientation model, not a universal RACI. Actual roles depend on deployment, contract, regulatory role, target system and release.
| Model | Possible use | Clarify before commitment |
|---|---|---|
| In-process / Embedded | OEM integration with a tight product boundary | target platform, binding, lifecycle, update and support model |
| Private Service | organization-owned platform service | API, identity, network, operations, monitoring and ownership |
| Managed / Operated | project with named runtime responsibility | availability, support, security response and evidence scope in contract |
Public briefs on integration contracts, specification change and responsibility boundaries without exposing internal implementation artifacts.