Product & Session
Product information, service-account context, login/logout and a clearly non-production cleanup path.
Communication as a product component—not as a second product.
MEMM places communication capabilities inside healthcare and OEM products through explicit host, API and native contracts. The bound R1001 evidence stays separate from the commercial integration narrative so scope, implementation state and external responsibilities remain reviewable.
Draft_TI-Messenger_26_2 and its Headless Client product type are considered as external engineering context. No general availability, approval or conformance is inferred from that reference.The value is a versionable contract that lets the host keep its own UX and business process while communication lifecycle, state and integration responsibilities remain bounded.
Selected protocol, E2EE and integration responsibilities stay behind a named Headless boundary rather than being rebuilt in every host.
Lifecycle, errors, ownership and release change are treated as explicit contracts.
The Rust-based core groups technical responsibilities that the host does not need to recreate inside the agreed scope.
The source-local host/native catalogue remains 37 operations. Calling is represented through the existing Messenger-operation boundary and is therefore reported separately instead of inflating the 37/37 counter.
Product information, service-account context, login/logout and a clearly non-production cleanup path.
FHIR-VZD-related visibility, authentication and MXID mapping plus practitioner and homeserver discovery inside the bound Headless scope.
Direct and room messaging, history, edits and controlled redaction/replacement variants.
Room lists, creation, settings, membership transitions, forget and state-event queries.
Upload and authenticated retrieval as named product operations inside the same host ownership boundary.
Explicit authorization mode and allow/block lists as typed Headless product boundaries.
R1001 covers call availability, invite, ringing, session, participants, media state, permissions, transport and encryption as 9/9 evidenced Messenger domains. Five signalling operations cover availability, invite, answer, reject and hangup; eleven bounded media/session operations cover session open/close, transport/ICE, permissions, encryption facts, media state, session phases, participants, renegotiation and finality.
The media runtime remains the integrating host's responsibility. MEMM carries signalling and versioned media/session/security facts across the Java 21 Panama, Kotlin and Swift boundary.
R1001 keeps the denominator fixed and binds every domain to executable source/test evidence inside its declared responsibility boundary.
All 63 domains are carried as executable_source at maturity 100 in the bound R1001 state.
Arithmetic breadth over the fixed 63-domain denominator: 100.00%.
The 26 Core Foundation domains are at 100.00% inside their declared scope.
Marker entries alone are not sufficient for the 100% state.
Lifecycle, update stream, projections, conversation/timeline, delivery, security, rooms, realtime, media, search and E2EE/cache foundations.
Account, device and room safety domains inside the fixed Messenger denominator.
Presentation, rich-event and related messaging domains with bounded evidence identity.
Call domains plus integration-oriented domains represented without changing the fixed denominator.
The public integration model separates the Rust implementation core from the host-facing ABI and language bindings.
Runtime updates are exposed through bounded subscription/update paths rather than creating an independent host-facing polling owner.
The embedded boundary does not introduce a second independent connection-pool owner for the host integration path.
Host bindings stay narrow and versioned instead of leaking internal runtime classes and state machines.
The product boundary aims to keep secret-bearing state out of public diagnostics and to make host/runtime ownership explicit. External transport and deployment controls remain separately operated.
E2EE state remains inside the bounded runtime responsibility instead of becoming a general host data model.
Diagnostics are limited to typed or redacted information rather than raw dependency text or secret material.
Shutdown and sensitive-state handling are part of the integration contract, while OS dump and raw-memory controls remain a deployment responsibility.
Network transport requires its own TLS, provider and operating boundary; it is not collapsed into the local FFI claim.
Public knowledge briefs explain the integration model without exposing private source paths, raw evidence or secret-bearing implementation detail.
Illustrative view of instances, state changes, open notices and integration status. All content is synthetic.
A first technical discussion compares your target architecture with the current MEMM product and integration boundaries without turning that discussion into a promise of availability, conformance or delivery date.
Map PVS, KIS, AVS, OEM or contact-center host boundaries, native integration and required Headless operations.
Review relevant external profiles and versions in the context of your target system while naming open or external prerequisites explicitly.
Separate host, MEMM and external TI/provider responsibilities before pilot assumptions become project risk.
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