Security Boundary

Cryptographic isolation in embedded Headless components

An embedded communication component should avoid turning cryptographic state into ordinary host application state. MEMM treats E2EE state, host-visible data, secret-safe diagnostics and external transport as distinct ownership zones and keeps sensitive implementation evidence outside the public site.

Topics:E2EESecret HandlingHeadless ClientIsolationDiagnostics

What should remain separated

  • Host business data and UI state.
  • Communication and cryptographic runtime state.
  • Secret-safe diagnostics and public observability.
  • External transport and provider behavior.

Public security wording remains bounded

The public architecture explains ownership and isolation principles but does not expose raw cryptographic material, internal runbooks, vulnerability details or low-level implementation evidence.

What this page explicitly does not claim: The isolation model is not an absolute security guarantee, certification statement or proof that every deployment is resistant to every threat.